

**A TALE OF TWO FREEDOMS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISLAMIC AND MODERNIST
PERSPECTIVES OF “FREEDOM”**

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Introduction

William Wallace's iconic shout "Freedom!" in the penultimate scene of the 1995 "Braveheart" film production allegorically illustrates the centrality of this concept, in the modern, as well as post-modern, ideology of the Christian West, although it is set in medieval times. For this character, freedom has been the quintessential tenet of his life and of the existence of his nation altogether. This paper argues that such an ontological emphasis on the value of "freedom" is the cornerstone of the philosophical, political, and economic foundations of the Western societies. By extension, it is the salient leitmotif of the populism-driven identity politics that delineate nowadays' international relations at most levels. To comparatively study the modern status of freedom in a comprehensive way, one needs to start by surveying the historical roots of the concept and of its diverse practices so as to be able to analyse the ramifications undergone by this notion across eras, societies, and cultures. This multidisciplinary contextualisation serves as a framework for the epistemological deconstruction of this phenomenon in a comparative analysis between the East and the West.

Ever since Greek antiquity, freedom has been fundamental in Western thinking about the universe, at large, and the human being, in particular. Indeed, classical philosophers considered freedom as the "freedom from want" thanks to the ability to "master oneself" (Warner 1963). This constitutes the basis of the classical definition of human beings as autonomous entities thanks to their thinking capacity. This stance is best represented by Socrates thus: "Then do you think that the man is free who is ruled by bodily desires and is unable to do what is best because of them?" (Marchant 1923). This perspective foregrounds that the mechanism of freedom is inherently an inner dynamic relationship between the Self's faculties: desire, inextricably rooted in the bodily flesh, and logic, seated in the mind's capacity to entertain thoughts about the metaphysical world of Ideals.

This stance has remained unchanged to a great extent during medieval times, in the East and in the West alike with “free will” as a site of theological and philosophical debates. Indeed, early Christian European thinkers largely agreed that freedom is, first and foremost, a spiritual question related to the soul of a human being and the extent of its freedom(s) in terms of thought and action. This clerical study was historically rooted on such biblical concepts as the “the Fall”, “the problem of evil”, and “causal determinism”. (Wright 2022)

As such, these contextualise freedom within the metaphysical framework, without discussing the concept of “freedom” in itself as a key part of the modern day socio-political debates. Indeed, freedom will only be viewed as a political theme within the post-modernist thought. Such controversies became centred on the belief that human beings should be distinguished from the rest of the creatures owing to their “immaterial rationing and cognising intellectual capacities” that allow them to think and act freely without being driven by the material instinctive stipulations that animals and plants are inextricably bound by. (Ellis 2017)

This elevates human beings above other forms of life by making them purposeful creatures with a transcendent message out of their existence, both physically and spiritually. A major proponent of this paradigm is Thomas Aquinas who maintained that the ultimate mission of believers should be to “achieve Happiness through knowing, and loving, God”. This responsibility, to him, is a noble justification for the sacrifices that Christian believers are expected to willingly present so as to attain God’s plan by forsaking their freedom, and ability, to satisfy their base needs through thinking of, and committing, sins rather than abide by God’s commandments that relatively limit the believers’ freedoms. (Lorei 1944)

Thus, the Christian medieval conception of freedom was based on the negative notion of piety-induced restraint rather on the positive notion of free will conducive to free action.

This is quite reminiscent of the Islamic depiction of “freedom” as the rejection of false deities other than “Allah”. Indeed, monotheism, in the Quran, is dependent upon exclusively and wholeheartedly worshipping a Creator as devout servants who attempt, to their best capacity, to obey Him and not be seduced by the Satanic mischiefs and the corporal whims of the soul manifest in evil thoughts, utterances, and deeds. (M.A Muqtedar 2019)

It follows that Islamic freedom is deemed as a God-given responsibility rather than being a privilege to follow one’s independent will. In Quranic terms, freedom is a burden chosen by humans to act as rulers on Earth. In Sura Al-Ahzab Verse 72, it is stated that “We did indeed offer the Trust (of reason and volition to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof” (Al Mawdoudi 1972). Indeed, freedom, for Muslims, is a conscious choice with pre-determined outcomes, not an existentialist license.

Indeed, Islamic freedom is solely attainable through its apparent opposite, servitude. A Muslim is expected to reject all “false gods” and fully embrace being a devout servant of an Almighty God, Allah. Indeed, the Quran dictates that believers are only entitled the freedoms that consolidate, and by no means compromise, their existential status as servants. Otherwise, their entire lives should revolve solely around Allah’s orders and prohibitions. It follows that, although one is free to accept or reject it, once one accepts the Islamic faith through reciting “Shahada” (Arabic for “testimony”), this verbal and spiritual, if symbolic, consent to identify as a “servant” to Allah eventually becomes a life-long, abiding and both physical and spiritual contract between the believers and Allah, themselves, and Otherhood. As such, the medieval stances on freedom are quite similar by comparison between the Christian and Islamic worldviews in terms of their mostly interchangeable and, only partly, distinguishable theological sources, moralistic aspects, and existential values.

Yet, it is worthy of note that there is a crucial discrepancy at the heart of the depictions of freedom(s) in the two traditions in terms of their sources, licenses, and uses. On the one hand, the Bible distinguishes between two spheres of existence, only one of which pertains to the “divine jurisdiction” which is that of the private life, one’s relation to oneself. However, public life, or the sphere of exchange between the present social selves, should not be regulated by a metaphysical God figure but by a humanly manifest, although God-like, political figure who acts as the shadow of God on Earth with “the right to divine rule”. Indeed, The Bible calls believers to honour this division and to “render, therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God’s the things that are God’s” (Mark 12: 17)

One major practical implication of this clerical distinction is the “Catholic Vs. Protestant Debate on the necessity, or lack thereof, of a series of mediating figures, starting with the local priests upwards to the Pope in the Vatican, to whom members of the church can resort so as to not so freely beg for prayers, confessions, and/or forgiveness from God through these originally religious but afterward socio-political emblems of authority.

On the other hand, Islam stipulates that all should only be delineated by the will of Allah, without dividing life into public and private spheres and with no mediations. Sura Al-Anaam Verse 162, ordains servantsto “Say: Surely my Prayer, all my acts of worship, and my living and my dying are for Allah alone, the Lord of the whole universe” (Al Mawdudi, 1972)

This follows that a Muslim needs no mediators to act upon their creed and rituals as they can pray to Allah for anything without waiting for the blessing of clergymen or for their informed, yet exclusive, explanations of holy, if inaccessible, scriptures.

Thus, this decidedly Christian distinction between the private and public spheres of life had laid the epistemological grounds for one of the major modern philosophical discussions about the dynamics between Secular Individualism and Religious Collectivism.

This is akin to the Montesquieu theory of “Social Contract” (Jo Ann 1976), to avoid indulging in what Allah forbids although human beings had initially been given the freedom to believe in the existence of God or not as part of their human privilege. (Khan 2019).

Yet, Montesquieu counts on the individuals’ pragmatic willingness to sacrifice parts of their freedoms so as to ensure the realisation of the best interests of the “public self”, and thus of the individual selves within this group who are eventually the ones to reap the fruits of these sacrifices in being protected, provided for, and dignified by the State, or the manifestation of the “Plural Self” that only exists through its citizens and for their benefits.

As such, the social principle behind modern political theories is based on the ideals of Democracy as a governance system that, first and foremost, foregrounds the value of the individual Self as the existentialist and political nucleus of being, meaning, and value.

Conversely, the Islamic pact is one that is expressly centred on the “Will of Allah” as the sole mechanism behind all levels and forms of life. A Muslim needs to yield their will and freedom before the orders of Allah, irrespective of one’s own desires once Allah is recognised as the sole Master. Indeed, this divine recentring is the Islamic counterpart to Liberalism in that a Muslim is not free to do as they wish provide that they hurt no one, as is the motto of nowadays’ liberals. Instead, Muslims are invited to make divine commandments, and not one’s freedom, the sole criterion of selecting their thoughts, utterances, and deeds. Yet, sinning believers cannot be ideal and or flawless beings. Indeed, to err, in the words of the Prophet PBUH, is an inherent human attribute provided that “all the lineage of Adam are prone to sinners and the best among them are the quickest to repent”. (Al Khattab 1989) Thus, whereas the Enlightenment pact liberates the individual per se, the Islamic doctrine of liberation bases it within a specifically theological framework as a servant of Allah.

Expectedly, this theistic moralistic conception of freedom is rejected by modernist philosophers who espouse a negative conception of freedom that focuses on the emancipation from all the political, social, and cultural constructs. (Berger and Luckmann 1966) As per the linguistic and symbolic arbitrariness governing the modern, and particularly post-modern, human experience in the times of “moral relativity” (Nietzsche 1882), “essentialist” has become a pejorative term used, by post-structuralist theorists, to characterise a pointless quest of an eternally illusive “Ideal Truth” as a trusted source of universal meaning and value. This pillar of human existence has been split into individual perspectives on personal experiences of self, language, and otherness. (Derrida 1987).

However, the latent irony in this paradigm shift is that these individual truths have, in turn, become undeniable absolutes as the individual perspective is now the sole source of “Truth”. Thus, studying the human phenomenon reduced its metaphysical aspects to a mere reflection of an interaction between multiple material features with no presence, or significance, of the “essentialist” realm of life in terms of existence, value, and meaning. In this constructivist post-modernist framework, it is no wonder that all the above mentioned philosophical categories are revolved around the Self that only realises its individuality by achieving freedom from, chief among others, what post-structuralist philosophers licensed themselves the freedom to term as “metaphysical superstitions” to be immediately deconstructed by virtue of the individual perspective allowed to existentially replace earlier sources of meaning such as Religion, Ethics, or Society, all of which are now considered essence-less cultural expressions that have no universal value or meaning, to be ironically substituted by another cultural expression more representative of any given one of the individual perspectives regarding all types, forms, and aspects of truths. (Jaroszynski 2018)

As such, the post-modern rebellion against the metaphysical worldview can be depicted, instead, as an existentialist “Copernicanism” of the “I” as the ontological basis of both the material and abstract worlds, thus replacing the earlier religious definition of a God. As such, Freedom is, both conceptually and pragmatically, rooted in three intellectual traditions representing the ideological textures of our contemporary realities, otherwise depicted to be not only “universally agreed upon” but also “absolute” (Zizek 1989).

These driving forces regulate today’s status quo ideologically, economically, and socially: “Secularism” is the modern day reconfiguration to Religion as both a lifestyle and a paradigm to establish a relationship between the “I” and the “Beyond” (Berlinerblau 2021); “Capitalism” is considered to be the de-facto perfect economic model to regulate the most effective relationships possible between the “I” and the “Other” (Piketty. 2013); and eventually “Individualism” is deemed the ideologically flawless psychological and social order to establish the most efficient relationships between the “I” and itself. (Coleman 1996). Indeed, one can safely maintain that these are the times of what I term “*Freedomism*” where the notion of freedom, in its Christian Eurocentric subtext, is the sole source of meaning, value, and importance alike to all levels of existence as shall be explained in detail below.

It is worthy of note that these lines are, by no means, a categorical rejection of the diverse theoretical and practical aspects of the di modern concepts of freedom(s) per se or a championing of an anti-abolitionist revival of institutionalised slavery of any form or support for discriminations on any base. Conversely, they are an invitation to undertake a collective postcolonial reconsideration of the concept, and its aftermaths, outside of the ideological biases governing its uses in the modern metaphysical, economic, and social discourses and practices spread by the increasingly populist Western Liberal Democracies. (Vincent 1995)

As previously detailed, modern western philosophical theorisations of the self and of the universe have long been based on a centralist conception of individual Self and on the ensuing centrality of its liberation from all potential forms of control to achieve the supposed purpose behind its existence by being able to reach its full potential in the “Land of the Free”. It is no accident that Plato, the earliest theoriser of the Greek Republic, made it exclusive to freemen without any representation for slaves or women, both of whom lacked freedom in his times due to diverse social and economic considerations. (Schmidtz & Pavel 2016)

Intuitively commonplace as it may seem, freewill is an ontological prerequisite for the human being who is, according to Aristotle, “by nature a political animal”. (Abbate 2016)

As such, the ability to think, and act, freely in the political sphere of life is the pillar of the classical perceptions of the State, from the perspective of its citizens as a valid chance for them to collectively enjoy the privileges of a higher form of human life, based on the centrality of their freedoms that need to be transcended, and protected at the same time. It follows that the role of the state was to protect these individual freedoms against any possible abuses or aberrations. Thus, this is not a case of an expansion of the individual self into a collective Self protected by the Laws, but rather of an individual self that is seeking to maintain existentialist survival away from the other selves, considered as potential threats to the self-sovereignty of the “I”. Indeed, this political stratification is based on the Hobbesian view of human beings as inherently evil creatures akin to the “wolf” prone to shrewdly inflict sufferings unto fellow human beings out of greed for power. (Voisset-Veysseyre 2010)

To face such a threat, the state needs to be able to exact a considerable amount of might to rein this brute force so as to eventually protect, even through immoral means, human beings’ most major asset: their freedom, as this ultimate end justifies the means. (Askew 2013)

At this level of the analysis, it is crucial to refocus on the “not so holy anymore trinity” of metanarratives that prescribe, to a large extent, the possible relationships a Westerner can develop in the fields of metaphysics, economy, or society respectively. It is worthy of note, to begin with, that this analysis does not at all aim to undertake a comprehensive ideological rereading of the entire Western thought heritage throughout its scope of fifteen centuries or so as such an intellectual endeavour can by no means be restrained in this specific comparative scope on the issue of freedom across religions. For convenience considerations, focus shall be laid on unravelling for the origins of three of today’s salient ideologies in the reportedly scientific, objective, and post-ideological mindset of the West, back to their religion-based worldview founded on the diverse conceptual and pragmatic developments undergone by Christendom spiritually , politically, and socially. These parallel patterns shall fortify the claim that the Christianity-founded Western notions, and therefore rhetorics and practices, of Freedom cannot be immediately or coercively universalised unto civilisations with a different worldview regarding the self-same concept of freedom and its practical implications in all walks of individual and communal life alike. Such a non-linear tracing of the history of the phenomenon and of its historiography serves as a more representative backgrounds of its diverse interactions among the three components of the “Grand Narrative of the West” both in terms of the ruling states and of their citizens alike. As such, one needs to embark on the ideological reconsideration with stressing that, from a historical and philosophical standpoint, the founding concept that gave birth to the other two is certainly that of free will, emanating from unprecedentedly heated clerical debates between the Catholics and the Protestants that conduced to a thorough rewriting of Christian social, philosophical, & economic doctrines that have formed the textures of the Middle Ages, and, most importantly, function as subtexts of modernity, late modernity, and post-modernity.

To begin with, the Protestant reformation has, as previously illustrated, reshaped the political and clerical history of Christianity since the beginning of the 16th century in Europe. This has been accomplished by virtue of introducing a new set of moral and practical values that challenge the once established principles of Catholicism with a view to reasserting one's independent individuality through asserting one's ability to endorse a personal version of the faith as all believers need to be considered priests, or interpreters of the Bible. (Walsh 1995)

Martin Luther, followed by others, maintained that Christian salvation should be attainable just by an honest belief in Jesus without the need to abide by good deeds. This is yet another instance of liberating the self from any metaphysical burdens of any actual responsibilities. Furthermore, the Protestant uprising came as a clerical rebellious movement appealing for the "democratisation" of Biblical interpretations, once regarded as the exclusive prerogative of Catholic priests that act as the entitled mouthpieces to the meanings of the Word of God. For Protestants, however, every believer is free to produce their own personal interpretation of the scripture as the only chosen path towards salvation under the "sola scriptura doctrine" resulting in forsaking earlier Christian traditions and replacing them with the principles of the Book itself that can be accessed immediately and personally with one's free sense of logic. Besides, the Protestant inherent sense of justification towards human sins to free themselves from this metaphysical sense of accountability by asserting that grace alone is sufficient to save one's soul through faith as all believers are freed from the burden of the original sin as they had all their sins forgiven by the sacrifice made by Christ on the cross thanks to their faith alone that allows them the freedom to have a direct access to God away from the clerical veneration that is a former privilege of priests now to be granted to all believers to free them from any hierarchical oppressions that deny them their ability to exist and believe freely. As such, the modern day emphasis on freedom can be traced to the Protestant reformation.

An immediate aftermath of this sect-induced paradigm shift is a rearrangement of the economic cycle of wealth production and distribution previously ordained by Feudalism. Indeed, the Catholic onset of Christianity was accompanied by an aristocratic group of privileged clergymen owing to their symbolic influence that they derive from their exclusive access to Holy Scriptures as venerated mouthpieces of the word of God in the world. To Max Weber, Capitalism has been born in modern Protestant cities by the economic apparatuses of administrative bureaucracy to oversee the Church-owned lands. (Weber 2001) Besides, the value of work, as the optimal means of capitalist production, is that it is not only the most efficient communal means of production but also an individual burden praised in words of the Bible: “He that will not work shall not eat.” (Thessalonians 3:10)

Indeed, the Eurocentric contradictions underlying Freedom, as it is understood and practiced in modern times, as an extension of the abovementioned conceptual triad, is succinctly illustrated by the crisis of the “Burkini Ban”, notably in modern day France. To begin with, the “Burkini” is an apparently well-meaning but, dangerously orientalist, coinage between the terms “Bikini” and “Burqa” (Arabic for face cover traditionally worn by women in the desert of Arabia) by an Arab-Australian lady who wanted to “change the Islamic symbol of a veil” (Engel 2016). This forceful epistemological marriage attempts to reconcile the two extreme opposites in the spectrum of clothing. On the one hand, the Bikini is viewed as a revolutionary emancipation of women’s bodies by almost wholly revealing them under the influence of the post-1968 “sexual revolution” theorised by, among others, Michel Foucault within the context of the postmodern second wave of feminism. (ibid) On the other hand, the Burqa is viewed as an exotic relic of the medieval patriarchal control of female bodies by coercively covering them against “the male gaze”. (ibid)

However, this concept is a problematic one, to say the least, at three levels.

Firstly, this entails a conceptual confusion between two dress behaviours: one that is pre-Islamic and tribal in nature used, as a cultural adaptation mechanism against extreme weather conditions in Arabia particularly, and in the East at large (The Burqa) and one that is an essentially religious visual expression of piety on the part of female believers (The Veil). Indeed, that the former is used by this designer interchangeably with the latter testifies to the cultural hegemony (Martin 2002) behind the deliberate, or otherwise, reduction of a holistic religious ritual to a mere cultural practice/emblem akin to a fashion display of garments. Eventually, this “de-essentialist” paradigm emanates from the above-mentioned rejection, or at least materialisation, of these metaphysical and ontological essences to reduce their value.

It follows that the Euro-centricity of this concept made the “veil” morphologically derived from, and thus symbolically inferior to, its cultural opposite manifest in the “Burqa”. The root of the phrasing makes it a marginalisation of one of its two components as well as a centralisation of the other. Such a tilted balance in the nature of the concept makes it a forceful universalisation of local ideals under the guise of “international law” to be respected by all parties, irrespective of their interests and their cultural and ideological peculiarities. This compulsion is a linguistically and symbolically tacit “modernisation” of otherwise “un-modernisable” conservative cultural traditions that can only exist in modern times through altered ways that negate, partially or completely, their symbolic essence and value. Due to an imposed paradigm shift derived from an unsolicited effort of “compulsory liberation”, this cultural mission is quite reminiscent of the colonial “White Man’s burden” to civilise other individuals or nations forcibly, coercively, and unilaterally. (Easterly 2007)

As such, the “Burkini” is a prime example of the cultural implications of a colonial mindset.

Eventually, this conflictual concept is but a reverberation of the socio-political dialogue on the long-established, if debatable, legal notions of “Private Vs. Public domains”. As such, the populism-based modern day identity politics allowed Eurocentrists, such as Marine LePen, to bluntly declare their latent xenophobic discourses and practices. She claims that the “Public Domain” of her country should be ideologically neutral under the French school of Secularism (Laïcité in French) that does not settle for State-Religion separation but, rather, calls for a legal obliteration of all religious forms of self-expression from the public sphere, namely those related to language, attire, and daily life customs. (Davis 2020)

To them, no one should be allowed to publicly express their religious beliefs, whether through utterances, clothes, and/or practices; even when these beliefs are inherently public in nature as they express their visions of not only themselves but also of the world around them. A Muslim woman is invited by Quranic verses to have as limited as possible a relationship with men from outside her biological family so as not to be a site of demonic temptation. It goes without saying that proponents of French secularism believe that this is a result of an inherently misogynistic religious discourse that aims at subjugating women to the rule of the “patriarchal will”. Far from denying that some Muslim men do indeed justify their demeaning of women by misinterpreted scriptures, these bespeak their own complexes and not the noble purposes behind the previously explained divine testing of women by abstain from following their instinctive desires to seem, and feel, beautiful and even desired. (Galadari 2012)

This dictation of going against one’s psychological desires can only understood within the Islamic existentialist paradigm that is based on the orders of Allah that have to be obeyed, regardless of whether believers like or even fathom these divine stipulations.

As such, one’s freedom is by no means a license to have a say on Allah’s orders.

Indeed, the above-mentioned Biblical distinction between “what is Caesar’s” and “what is God’s” is not valid in Islam that has, along with the individual commandments, a list of collective regulations that delineate the norms of the supposedly neutral public domain, of the Islamic Nation in the fields of, among others, economy, social relations, and governance. This duality of jurisprudence paints a holistic worldview of the servants’ mission in their lives. They are expected to freely ponder upon the set of prearranged lifestyle guidelines with a view to extract God’s intention behind them. Should they, however, fail to understand the supposed message(s) behind divine instructions, they are to abide by them as an eventual accomplishment of their ontological status of exclusive servitude to the Almighty Allah.

However, some Muslim thinkers have, under the ideological impact of late capitalism post-modernism, concurred the “theological liberation” trend by adopting anachronistic interpretations of the founding texts of Islam so as to devalue them by means of adjudicating them from the biased standpoint of the present experienced by this Self. (Said 1981)

One such illustration is based on the above-explained constructivist tradition in what can be creatively termed as “I-Theism” consisting a new form of religion that has a limitless scope for the Self to freely make its own projected readings as verified intellectual principles superseding any other interpretations dismissively termed “backwardist”, an end-all accusation that hardly needs any actual substantial evidence or discussions.as if being deemed a “progressivist” were the only morally good and politically sound course of thought and action in these postmodern times. All is justified to honour this grand purpose.

It follows that such individuals do not think twice before giving themselves the absolute freedom to wholeheartedly denounce any form or level of “conservatism” as an absolute incarnation of evil to be individually and collectively fought at all costs. (Życiński (2010).

Indeed, that stance is quite ripe with both conceptual discrepancies and practical contradictions that are mostly emanating from a flawed conception of individual and communal freedom(s) that place them above all other ideals, aspects, and levels of existence. To begin with, that a given span of time is anointed as the best representative of progress is a historiographical shift away from the scientologist perception that value is a subjective social construct objectively depends on the intersection of individual perspectives to Life. This centralisation of the self emanates from the foregrounding of subject experiences of Truth, rather than continuing to abide by the pre-ordained ideological worldview, this selective and linear vision of history bespeaks a firm belief that one is free to label items and phenomena at will in a creativity way that expresses one's individuality in as close to an authentic life representation as possible.

The second half of this historical shift is a centralist vision of the geo-politics of the world as split between two worlds: the "free" one and its counterpart: the "not so free" one. As such, freedom is not only an individual selection criterion but also a collective mechanism of international relations and as the criteria of measuring the actual extent of the spread of freedoms and the efficiency of their application into reality, such classifications cannot be more than a convenient channel of diverse forms of racism, discrimination, and xenophobia. Indeed, this ability to unilaterally assign meanings and categories through the linguistic tools of ideology is primarily based on the previously mentioned structural contradiction of linguistic arbitrariness. An extension of this theoretical debacle is that post-modern thinkers believe they are free to assign themselves elements of identity that they not only firmly believe in but also want to make it a fact that requires nothing but unanimous agreement and unshaking consent. This free existentialist choice is behind the postmodern cultural leitmotif.

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Indeed, the belief that one can, and even, identify as they please is an immediate aftermath of the existential revolutionary license granted to the Self so as to free itself from the symbolic oppression of the social constructs imposed on the Individual Freedom.

To begin with, revolutionising the concepts of sex and gender by the hands of the different generations of feminist theorists could not have been possible nor this successful without the advance of a list of premises that constitute the conceptual foundations of this complex perspective to the Self. First, they started by denying the religious concept of the instinct as the foundation of social relations. This conceptual negation conducted to the re-evaluation of these relations as characteristically political, rather than emotional or social. ()

Indeed, all is constructed in a world without natural human instincts. Thus, dismantling all social institutions, major among which is the family, has become a noble revolutionary.

This conflictual approach to human relationship is likely to culminate in unsurmountable antagonisms that dissolves all forms of social or symbolic ties once uniting individuals within entities and groups. Defensive communities are, therefore, reduced to isolated individuals.

The emancipatory quest is one based on the existentialist “protection of the Self” viewed as one’s most prized asset that is under constant threat that, to the proponents of identity politics, justifies their conspiratorial and minority-based political rhetoric. (Source)

Indeed, that sexuality has become a site for freedom fighters as a purposeful choice for an orientation through which one can freely choose to achieve one’s individual and public identity, rather than a set of mere biological facts to be inherited upon birth without much intervention on the part of this individual who can only follow the preordained norms.

This interventionist stance allows the self to reach existentialist freedom so as to control its otherwise subconscious motives by politicising the discourse on gender relations.

As such, the expansion of the “I”, in terms of social relations, politicises the freedom paradigm in the individual and public spheres of the society as the unit of human gathering.

Conclusion:

Across religious, and non-religious human traditions, freedom has always been highlighted as the most essential human attribute both politically and philosophically, in terms of both individual and collective thoughts, words, and actions. However, postmodernist freedom is based on the symbolic idolisation of the self “I” as The nucleus of the material worldview founded on three principles: Protestantism, Individualism, and Capitalism.

A major repercussion of this paradigmatic shift is that the existential values of the I in the postmodern Muslim and Christian are quite irreconcilable. Whereas the latter functions in a secular framework that makes of the “I” not only the centre of the human being but that of life in all its forms; the former places the “I” within the limits of the role of a servant creature expected to worship a perfect Allah with a more theistic scope for this freedom which becomes an existentialist and symbolic mission

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